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THE PROSECUTION’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE: MORE REASON TO 
LITIGATE?*
1  Introduction
Pursuant to the finding of the constitutional court in Shabalala v Attorney-General 
of Transvaal (1995 2 SACR 761 (CC)) that the blanket docket privilege in criminal 
cases as enunciated in R v Steyn (1954 1 SA 324 (A)) was inconsistent with the right 
to a fair trial as guaranteed by the 1993 constitution (interim constitution), courts 
have been called upon to adjudicate on a number of questions that arose in relation 
to the prosecution’s duty to disclose. This was to be expected, as the constitutional 
court emphasized that, should the state object to disclosure, each individual case 
had to be decided on its own merits with reference to the guidelines provided in this 
regard by the constitutional court (par 55).
In this contribution the initial objections raised in the Shabalala case in support 
of the privilege against disclosure are again briefly considered and evaluated, where 
possible with the knowledge of hindsight, to establish whether or not the notions 
that informed the objections indeed manifested themselves to the detriment of the 
criminal justice system. Consideration is given to the state’s approach to disclosure, 
the duty to disclose as interpreted by the courts in two recent decisions and the 
question is posed to what extent, if at all, the prosecution’s duty to disclose is utilized 
for purposes other than to ensure a fair trial. The extent to which the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the act) and the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
2 of 2000 (PAIA) contain provisions, in addition to the state’s duty to disclose, to 
assist an accused person to obtain sufficient information in order to advance his case 
is also considered.
2  Background
Prior to the constitutional dispensation the state exercised a blanket docket privilege 
in terms of the decision in R v Steyn (1954 1 SA 324 (A)) (for a discussion on its 
origin and nature, see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 
(2011) 23-40). This privilege extended to the contents of the entire police case 
docket, including witness statements, expert reports and documentary evidence 
contained in part A of the docket, internal reports and memoranda (part B) and the 
investigation diary (part C) and existed until at least conclusion of the proceedings 
on appeal. The privilege entailed that disclosure of the docket contents could only be 
obtained with consent of the state. Disclosure seldom occurred before or during trial, 
with the exception of when a serious discrepancy arose between the testimony of the 
witness and the contents of his statement. The prosecutor would then be required, 
in view of his special duty to assist the court in arriving at the truth, to make the 
witness statement available to the defence for purposes of cross-examination (the 
Steyn case 337A).
After acceptance of the interim constitution the question arose in the Shabalala 
case whether the blanket docket privilege of the pre-constitutional era could survive 
the fair trial guarantees contained in section 25(3) of the interim constitution. Section 
25(3), which provided that “[e]very accused person shall have the right to a fair trial, 
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which shall include the right … (b) to be informed with sufficient particularity of 
the charge …”, was amplified by section 23, which guaranteed that “[e]very person 
shall have the right of access to all information held by the state … in so far as such 
information is required for the exercise or protection of any of his rights”. In finding 
the blanket docket privilege inconsistent with the constitutionally guaranteed fair 
trial rights, the constitutional court ruled that the right to a fair trial would include 
access to the statements of witnesses and such content of the police docket as are 
relevant in order to enable an accused person to properly exercise that right. The 
court further indicated that the prosecution might in a particular case be able to 
justify the denial of access on the grounds that it is not justified for purposes of a fair 
trial (par 72). The court emphasized that no rigid rules should be formulated in this 
regard and that the circumstances of each case should determine what is required 
for a fair trial, referring to a few examples where a fair trial might not require such 
access (par 37-38). The general tenor of the judgment was however indicative of the 
fact that the emphasis had shifted to accountability and transparency.
3  Did the fears materialize?
Five general objections were raised in support of the privilege against disclosure. 
Some of the objections anticipated that disclosure of the contents of case dockets 
would eventually have a negative impact on the criminal justice system. Although 
the objections failed to convince the constitutional court that they were, either 
individually or combined, of sufficient import to justifiably limit the fair trial rights 
of an accused person it is nevertheless of value to revisit the objections to determine 
what effect docket disclosure had on the criminal justice system.
3.1 It was firstly contended that inaccuracies occurred frequently in written 
statements made by witnesses to the police due to administrative and language 
difficulties as well as logistical challenges experienced during the initial stage of 
investigations. It was suggested that disclosure of such statements might lead to 
cross-examination and unfairly impact on credibility after a witness delivered more 
comprehensive and considered evidence in court. The constitutional court countered 
this objection by indicating that a trial court should be alive to the fact that witness 
statements are compiled by police officers with administrative, linguistic and 
logistical problems. It further noted that the possibility of disclosure might serve 
as an incentive to police officers to compile statements as accurately as possible 
(par 45).
The courts are indeed sensitive to the problematic situation pertaining to 
inaccurate and poorly drafted witness statements. In S v Mafaladiso (2003 1 SACR 
583 (SCA) 594A-G) the supreme court of appeal warned that language and cultural 
differences between the witness and the person who recorded the statement should 
be considered when discrepancies between a witness’s evidence in court and her 
statement are evaluated (also see S v Bruiners 1998 2 SACR 432 (SE) 437G-J). The 
hope expressed by the constitutional court that the possibility of disclosure might 
improve the quality of statements unfortunately never materialized, possibly owing 
to low experience levels and linguistic and other challenges still being experienced 
by the South African Police Service.
3.2 The second objection related to an accused person “tailoring” evidence after 
having had the opportunity to peruse the statements of state witnesses. Although 
the constitutional court agreed that the state would in some matters lose the tactical 
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advantage of surprise, it pointed out that the normal principles applicable to trials 
and the testing and evaluation of evidence would enable a court to establish the 
credibility of an accused person’s defence (par 46).
The allegations against an accused are contained in a charge sheet provided to him 
before trial and the opportunity has always existed to request further particulars in 
terms of section 87 of the act in order to clarify the charges. In addition thereto, an 
accused is not compelled to reveal the basis of his defence after pleading not guilty 
and the burden of proof on the state requires the prosecution to commence with the 
presentation of evidence. It can therefore not be reliably stated that the disclosure of 
witness statements created an opportunity that did not already exist, to some extent, 
to “tailor” evidence or fabricate defences or increase the incidence thereof.
3.3 The concern was expressed that disclosure would place an onerous burden 
on the prosecution and may lead to delays in bringing an accused to trial. The 
constitutional court correctly pointed out that this objection held little weight, as a 
prosecution could in any event not commence without the statements having been 
prepared (par 47). In addressing this concern the court indicated that:
“… disclosure will not be necessary in a large number of cases because the State may be able 
successfully to contend that, regard being had to the relative triviality of the charge or its inherently 
simple content or the particularity already furnished to the accused … no access to the police docket 
is justified for the purposes of ensuring a fair trial for the accused” (par 47).
In practice the prosecution follows a more liberal approach in respect of disclosure. 
Part 14 of the policy directives of the national prosecuting authority does not draw a 
distinction between different types of cases as alluded to in the Shabalala case. Full 
disclosure of witness statements takes place on request by the accused, irrespective 
of the nature of the charges levelled and irrespective of whether further particulars 
have been requested and provided. General disclosure of witness statements as 
contained in part A of the docket therefore takes place as a matter of policy. In 
terms of the policy directives, requests for parts B and C are however refused as a 
general rule and accused persons have to formally apply to court for disclosure of the 
documentation contained therein. The constitutional court provided the following 
guidelines as possible factors that might justify non-disclosure: the real risk that 
the identity of an informer might be disclosed, state secrets might be revealed, 
and intimidation of state witnesses and impeding the proper ends of justice might 
occur (par 50). The disclosure of policing methods and investigative techniques and 
revelation of confidential cooperation between various police forces are listed in the 
policy directives as further factors justifying non-disclosure (part 14.3).
It is submitted that it would be an incorrect interpretation to infer from this 
objection that the investigation cannot proceed after an accused has been charged or 
after the trial has commenced. Although the ideal would be that a case is not enrolled 
or a trial at least not commenced with before the investigation is finalized, reality 
and practical considerations dictate otherwise. The prosecution should for example 
be in a position to follow up on defences raised or investigate new information 
that comes to light during the trial. New evidence so discovered obviously also has 
to be disclosed to the accused (see Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of 
Evidence (2009) 173).
The constitutional court predicted that disclosure might encourage the offering 
of guilty pleas and shorten delays (par 47). No statistical data is available to indicate 
whether the number of guilty pleas has indeed increased for this reason since 1995, 
but it seems logical that an accused person presented with copies of a thoroughly 
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investigated, watertight case will be advised to offer a guilty plea. It appears, 
however, that the concept of disclosure might unfortunately be susceptible to abuse 
and in fact be utilized to cause delays. This aspect will be more fully considered in 
the discussion below.
3.4 The fourth objection related to concerns that the trial might become side-
tracked into “extraneous issues” as to what a witness might or might not have said 
on a previous occasion (par 48). This concern is closely linked to the first objection 
and would once again require of the trial court to consider the relevance of and 
apportion the necessary weight to possible discrepancies between a witness’s 
statement and his testimony in court. Legal representatives, whether from the 
prosecution or defence, are in any event required to protect their witnesses and 
object to irrelevant cross-examination. Courts should also be vigilant in this regard 
and not allow long-winded excursions on irrelevant matters. There appears to be no 
major or insurmountable challenges in this regard.
3.5 The last objection expressed concern for possible intimidation of witnesses and 
prejudice to the ends of justice or state interests. The court found that the interests of 
the accused in a fair trial outweighed the interests of the state in the non-disclosure 
of statements (par 49). This finding refers to a category of witnesses earlier listed 
by the court as those not requiring protection for fear of intimidation (par 40). As 
regards vulnerable witnesses, the court remarked that “… there appears to be an 
overwhelming balance in favour of an accused person’s right to disclosure in those 
circumstances where there is no reasonable risk that such disclosure might lead 
to … intimidation or obstruction of the proper ends of justice” (par 50). The task 
of deciding whether the state is justified in refusing to disclose statements on this 
ground rests with the trial court after receiving evidence to determine the extent of 
the risk.
It does not appear as if this aspect causes undue difficulties in practice. To ensure 
minimal interference with the investigation process, disclosure is as a rule only made 
after finalization of the investigation. To this end section 60(14) of the act provides 
that an accused person is not entitled to access the case docket for purposes of a 
bail application. A further practical arrangement employed by the police entails that 
personal and contact particulars of witnesses are completed on a separate document 
named “preamble to statement” (form SAP 3M(a)), which is attached to the actual 
witness statement. In cases where the state would not want to disclose these details 
of witnesses to the accused, the preamble document could simply be removed from 
the actual statement.
Although none of the initial objections seems to have had a general negative 
impact on the criminal justice system, other difficulties not anticipated in the 
Shabalala case did arise and are discussed below.
4  The duty to disclose as interpreted by the courts
Section 32 of the 1996 constitution provides that everyone has the right of access to 
any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise 
or protection of any rights. The challenges pertaining to the prosecution’s duty to 
disclose that arose in Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice (2011 2 SACR 109 (GNP)) and 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v King (2010 2 SACR 146 (SCA)) will be 
considered. Although the Kerkhoff case was reported a year after the King matter, it 
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is discussed first, as the judgment was delivered approximately a month prior to the 
judgment in the King case.
4.1  Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice
The applicant was charged in the Brits regional court with three counts of sexual 
assault (contravention of s 5(1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (the sexual offences act)), three counts of 
compelling or causing children to witness a sexual act (contravening s 21(1) of the 
sexual offences act) and one count of assault. The applicant applied in the Brits 
district court for an order to compel the state to disclose the whole police docket 
(parts A, B and C). The prosecutor opposed discovery in respect of parts B and C 
but after hearing evidence the court ordered disclosure of the whole docket. Copies 
were thereupon provided to the applicant (par 12.4). The state intended to call the 
five complainants, all boys aged 10 or 11, to testify. To this end it also intended 
to request the court to appoint an intermediary in terms of section 170A of the 
act to assist the complainants to give evidence. The state obtained intermediary 
reports to assist the court to make its decision. The reports, compiled by the seventh 
respondent (a qualified social worker) employed by the sixth respondent (a company 
incorporated in terms of section 21 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973), indicated that 
the complainants should testify through an intermediary and were included in the 
case docket. The applicant intended to show before the trial commenced that the 
evidence of the complainants was neither competent nor admissible, failing which, 
to oppose the appointment of intermediaries to assist the complainants leaving them 
to testify in open court without the protection afforded to children by section 170A. 
(The court made important comments and findings about the application of section 
170A relating to intermediaries (par 6-7; 21). A discussion of those comments, 
however, falls outside the scope of this contribution.) In order to achieve this, the 
applicant sought the seventh respondent’s working papers containing the documents 
relating to the tests the social worker had conducted on the complainants as well as 
her process notes and summaries from which she compiled her reports. The applicant 
applied to the Brits regional court for these documents. Despite the fact that these 
documents did not form part of the docket, the application was not opposed by the 
prosecutor and the court ordered disclosure of the documentation. The sixth and 
seventh respondents were unaware of the disclosure application and refused to make 
these documents available to either the prosecution or the accused. The refusal was 
based on the sixth respondent’s operational policy in terms of which the documents 
were considered to be private and confidential. The policy was formulated, as 
children, and their parents and guardians who approached the sixth respondent for 
assistance, required their communications to be confidential (par 12.11).
As a result the applicant approached the high court seeking an order that the 
second to fifth respondents be found in contempt for failure to comply with the 
above court order and be sentenced to either imprisonment or a fine suspended on 
condition that the order of disclosure be complied with. A further order was sought, 
directing the sixth and seventh respondents to inter alia make the said documents 
available to the applicant.
All the respondents initially opposed the application but at a later stage the sixth 
and seventh respondents withdrew their opposition and abided by the decision of the 
court. During argument the applicant informed the court that he no longer sought 
relief against the second to fifth respondents. The concession was however made 
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too late to save the applicant from a cost order in view of the vexatious nature of the 
application in respect of the second to fifth respondents (par 20).
The remaining issue to be decided by the court was whether the applicant had 
demonstrated a right to disclosure of the documents in possession of the sixth and 
seventh respondents. The applicant based his argument that the respondents were 
obliged to disclose these documents on two grounds: firstly that the documents 
formed part of the docket (even though it had never been physically part of the 
docket) and that as a result the Shabalala case found application; and secondly 
that section 32 of the constitution provides that everyone has the right of access 
to any information that is held by another person and that is required for the 
exercise or protection of any rights (par 15). Southwood J correctly rejected the first 
argument that the documents formed part of the case docket. The sixth and seventh 
respondents did not form part of the prosecution or any state institution. As a result 
the Shabalala case was not applicable to the documents in their possession (par 16). 
This finding of the court is of particular significance. After the Shabalala case the 
prosecution’s duty to disclose was interpreted by several accused in applications 
of this nature to include disclosure of documents or information that the accused 
regarded as necessary to prepare for his defence, but which did not form part of the 
police docket and which were not otherwise in possession of the state. As a result 
applications were made (mostly in the lower courts) for access to information the 
state never investigated and did not possess. The lower courts did not approach 
these applications uniformly: some applications were correctly denied but others 
were granted, having the unfortunate effect that the criminal investigation was 
often turned into an unending search mission for documents and information 
required by the accused, causing delays in the administration of justice and even 
shifting the focus away from answering the charges. This position should however 
be distinguished from the situation where the state is in possession of additional 
documentation which are not included in the docket. The state may not refuse to 
disclose documents in its possession merely on the basis that they do not form part 
of the docket (S v Rowand 2009 2 SACR 450 (W) 455B-H; Whitear-Nel 2010 SACJ 
263 265). Relevant information acquired during the course of the investigation 
forms part of that to which the accused is entitled, irrespective of whether it has 
been included in the case docket or not.
The court also rejected the applicant’s direct reliance on section 32 of the 
constitution as its second ground to obtain disclosure from the respondents. In view 
of the existence of PAIA, Southwood J found that a party has to assert its right to 
access of information in terms of the provisions of PAIA and not by relying on the 
constitution (par 17). The applicant, however, did not seek access in terms of PAIA, 
and it appears from the judgment that during argument applicant’s counsel first 
submitted that PAIA did not apply but later argued that it did find application. The 
question whether PAIA finds application in criminal matters is of importance, but in 
view of the approach taken by the applicant, the court was not called upon to decide 
this question. This aspect will be considered more fully below in the discussion on 
the King matter, where the question was decided by the supreme court of appeal.
Having rejected both grounds relied on by the applicant, the court found that a 
right to access was not demonstrated and the application was refused. In conclusion, 
the court remarked that the purpose of the application was misconceived and that 
it served no other purpose but to delay the commencement of the trial (par 21). 
This observation is disturbing, the more so in view of the fact that the charges are 
of a serious nature and the complainants are of a very young age. Unnecessary 
delays in the trial could impact negatively on the recollection of events by witnesses 
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(especially minors) and the ultimate outcome and fairness of the proceedings. The 
question arises why a simpler and less time-consuming process, such as the serving 
of a subpoena duces tecum on the sixth and seventh respondents, was not followed. 
The conclusion appears to be inevitable that the disclosure process was abused to 
prolong and possibly even derail the prosecution of the accused.
4.2  National Director of Public Prosecutions v King
The respondent in this matter was charged with 322 counts of fraud, tax evasion, 
contravention of the Exchange Control Regulations, money-laundering and 
racketeering. The South African Revenue Services (SARS) was the main complainant 
and apparently had a claim of R3 billion against the respondent emanating from 
some of the allegations. The case has a long history: the respondent was arrested 
in 2002 and at the time of this appeal (Feb 2010) the trial had not yet commenced. 
The docket was substantial: it comprised 200 000 pages in part A (copies of which 
were supplied to the respondent), electronic records in part B of about 21 000 
emails between parties involved in the case and a further 270 lever-arch files of 
documents not included in part A. Copies of the statements and documents in part 
A were supplied to the respondent, but the state refused to disclose parts B and C. 
As a result the respondent (applicant a quo) applied to the court a quo for an order 
directing the state to grant him access to all documents in its possession, which were 
relevant to the charges against him and not privileged (par 12). In addition thereto 
the respondent also required access to all documentation providing evidence of the 
contact between counsel in private practice appointed to conduct the prosecution 
and SARS, to enable him to bring an application for the removal of those prosecutors 
(par 22). Having failed in his bid to gain access to these, the respondent required a 
full description of each and every document to which he was denied access, with a 
statement of the precise basis upon which access was denied (a “motivated index”). 
The appellant (respondent a quo) opposed the application on inter alia the grounds 
that the documents in parts B and C were either irrelevant to the criminal case or not 
exculpatory or prima facie likely to be helpful to the defence in the trial or privileged 
from disclosure on a variety of grounds or that the public interest in preserving its 
confidentiality outweighed any interest the respondent might have in its disclosure 
(par 13). It was further submitted that the compilation of a motivated index would be 
an arduous task of considerable cost and that the implication thereof would impact 
on the criminal justice system, as it would create an extension on the Shabalala 
principles (par 16). The court a quo found that the respondent was entitled to the 
motivated index requested to satisfy him in advance that the trial would be fair. The 
national director of public prosecutions appealed against this finding to the supreme 
court of appeal (par 3).
The respondent argued that the assumption could be made that all the withheld 
documents were relevant to his prosecution as that could be the only reason for its 
inclusion in the docket (par 28). The respondent relied in this regard on the decision 
in R v McNeil (2009 SCC 3) in which the supreme court of Canada found that the 
following two assumptions are implicit in the crown’s duty to disclose: firstly, that 
the material in possession of the crown is relevant to the accused’s case, otherwise 
it would not have been obtained, and, secondly, the material would likely comprise 
the case against the accused (par 20). In addressing this argument the supreme 
court of appeal pointed out that the second assumption was not applicable, as the 
parties were agreed that the material comprising the case against the respondent 
was contained in part A of the docket, which had already been supplied. Regarding 
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the first assumption the court found that it referred to information gathered during 
the course of the investigation and not material created (par 30). Illustrating the 
point, the court referred to its initial comment that the blanket privilege has not been 
replaced by a blanket right to all the information in the hands of the prosecution. 
It confirmed that litigation privilege, although limited by the duty to disclose, does 
still exist to the extent that it pertains to documents that do not comprise evidence or 
information relevant to the defence (par 2). Such documentation would for example 
include opinions by prosecutors, notes on legal research and copies of judgments, 
and as it is not material relevant to the conduct of the trial, it is not discoverable 
(par 30).
The respondent also relied on the fundamental right of access to information 
held by the state in terms of section 32(1)(a) of the constitution in order to obtain 
the contents of the whole docket (par 36). In view of the existence of PAIA, the 
respondent could not rely on the constitution to obtain access to information (Zeffert 
and Paizes The South African Law of Evidence (2007) 785; Ingledew v Financial 
Services Board: in re Financial Services Board v Van der Merwe 2003 4 SA 584 
(CC) par 24). Section 7(1) of PAIA, however, provides that the act does not apply to 
a record of a public or private body if:
“(a)  that record is requested for the purpose of criminal or civil proceedings;
(b)  so requested after the commencement of such criminal or civil proceedings …;
(c)  the production of or access to that record for the purpose referred to in paragraph (a) is 
provided for in any other law.”
The supreme court of appeal found that “other law” refers to the body of law that 
includes the rules relating to discovery, disclosure and privilege and therefore that 
PAIA cannot be utilized if access to information is required for purposes of criminal 
proceedings (par 39; also see Schwikkard and Van der Merwe 178).
A further aspect raised by the respondent related to the reliance placed on the 
mere ipse dixit of the state to justify withholding of relevant documents in the docket 
(par 32). Although the Shabalala judgment is clear on the aspect that a court has to 
decide on disclosure if the state objects thereto (par 53), the supreme court of appeal 
reiterated that this matter is about something else, namely the right to a motivated 
index to enable the respondent to audit parts B and C of the docket. The court found 
that on this basis the initial decision remained that of the state, but if the decision is 
shown to be prima facie wrong during the trial, a court could make the necessary 
order to disclose (par 32).
Harms DP concluded that the respondent did not reasonably require a motivated 
index of parts B and C to enable him to conduct his defence and upheld the appeal 
(par 48).
Nugent JA concurred with the judgment, but made the following closing remark 
with which the rest of the court agreed:
“In effect, Mr King wants the prosecution to satisfy him, as a precondition to being tried, that his 
trial will be fair. I do not think that s 35(3) goes that far. In its terms it entitles Mr King to be tried 
fairly in fact. It does not entitle him to be satisfied that the trial will be fair. If he were able to show 
in advance that his trial would not be fair it might be that the court would grant him appropriate 
relief. But the prosecution is not called upon to satisfy an accused person that his trial will be fair 
as a precondition to prosecuting. If that were to be required as a precondition for a trial it seems to 
me that there might be few criminal trials at all. Criminal proceedings are not a consensual affair” 
(par 57-58).
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Considering the protracted history of this case (par 7-8) as background to the 
present application, the inevitable inference to be drawn appears to be that, as in the 
Kerkhoff case, disclosure was used as a means of avoiding the trial.
5  Provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act
In addition to the state’s constitutional duty to disclose relevant information in 
its possession to the accused, the act contains important provisions to assist an 
accused person to obtain further information pertaining to the charges against him. 
Section 87 of the act provides for the request and supply of particulars to a charge 
whilst section 179 provides for the issuing of a subpoena duces tecum to obtain the 
attendance at criminal proceedings of any person in order to produce any book, 
paper or document.
5.1  Further particulars
The purpose of further particulars is to inform the accused of the case against him 
so that he can prepare his defence (Kruger Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure (2011) 
14-21). Section 87 provides as follows:
“87(1) An accused may at any stage before any evidence in respect of any particular charge has 
been lead [sic], in writing request the prosecution to furnish particulars or further particulars of any 
matter alleged in that charge, and the court before which a charge is pending may at any time before 
any evidence in respect of that charge has been led, direct that particulars or further particulars be 
delivered …
 (2) … and the trial shall proceed as if the charge had been amended in conformity with such 
particulars.”
The section provides for a simple procedure, allowing the accused to apply for 
particulars and if the reply thereto is unsatisfactory, to apply for further particulars. 
If the state’s response remains unsatisfactory, the accused may object to the charge 
in terms of section 85(1) of the act. Should a court find that the objection is well-
founded, it shall make such order relating to the amendment of the charge or the 
delivery of particulars it may deem fit. Should the prosecution fail to comply with 
such order, the court may quash the charge. Particulars might be requested before 
or after plea, but should be requested and supplied before any evidence is presented. 
The stage at which particulars are to be requested is a tactical decision, impacting on 
the remedies available to the accused should the state fail to supply the particulars 
(see Watney “Particulars to a charge in cases where the state relies on the doctrine 
of common purpose: easy answers to difficult questions?” 1999 TSAR 323 325-326). 
Application for disclosure of the docket, on the other hand, might be made at any 
stage, even after the trial has commenced. The state is bound to any particulars 
it provided in terms of section 87, unless it expressly abandoned a particular. 
Particulars supplied form part of the charge and, as with the allegations contained 
in the charge, must be proven. For this reason it would be incorrect to utilize section 
87 to apply for disclosure of the case docket (see S v Tshabalala 1999 1 SACR 163 
(T) 166H-J; Du Toit et al 23-42L-2; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe 173). As the 
act makes no provision for a procedural mechanism in this regard, the practice has 
developed to address a written request for disclosure to the relevant prosecutor (the 
Tshabalala case 169D-E and the Rowand case 458A-C).
Any attempt to embarrass either the state with a cumbersome request or the 
accused with a vague and confusing reply will not be tolerated by the courts. Section 
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84(2) of the act allows for the state to indicate as such if particulars requested are 
unknown to the prosecution. Particulars might be requested before or after the state 
has disclosed the contents of the case docket. Although docket disclosure resulted in 
a reduction of requests for particulars, especially in respect of less complex matters, 
the provisions of section 87 have not become superfluous. Factors such as reliance on 
the doctrine of common purpose, incomplete witness statements and badly drafted 
charge sheets will more often than not give rise to a request for particulars, despite 
disclosure of the docket.
As the aim with particulars is to inform the accused person of the case against him 
to enable him to prepare his defence, care should be taken that the procedure is not 
abused to conduct a paper trial in which the strength of the state case or the decision 
to prosecute is attacked (see Watney 334-337). At this stage of the proceedings a 
court is not called upon to make a judgment on the strength or otherwise of the state 
case, but to ensure that the accused is properly informed of the case against him.
5.2  Subpoena duces tecum
Section 179(1)(a) of the act provides that the prosecutor or accused may compel the 
attendance of any person to give evidence or to produce any book, paper or document 
in criminal proceedings. This is applicable to any competent and compellable 
witness. In order to obtain a book, paper or document at court a subpoena is served 
in the same manner as an ordinary subpoena on the person in whose possession the 
relevant item is. The documents required must be specified in the subpoena. This 
subpoena is referred to as a subpoena duces tecum. An accused may also issue a 
subpoena duces tecum on a state witness (Kruger 23-4; Cave v Johannes NO 1949 
1 SA 72 (T) 77). It is submitted that a witness might be so subpoenaed to obtain 
documents required for trial preparation even before the trial commences. Section 
179(i)(a) provides that a person may be compelled to attend to produce any book, 
paper or document in criminal proceedings. Rule 54 of the high court rules and rule 
64 of the magistrates’ court rules also refer to “… any criminal case …” and do not 
specifically refer to trial. The wording of the section could therefore be interpreted 
to provide for the attendance of a person in circumstances wider than just the trial 
itself. This is supported by the fact that a person attending court in terms of a 
subpoena duces tecum is not necessarily regarded as a witness unless he is required 
to testify to identify the requested documents (see Erasmus Superior Court Practice 
(2011) 82; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe 363). It is suggested that a person could 
be subpoenaed for such an inquiry by an accused to hand over documents on a 
date scheduled with the court and prosecutor. If he produces the documents and no 
identification thereof is required, it is the end of the matter. If he declines to produce 
the documents, however, the court will have to inquire as to the reasons for refusal 
and make an appropriate order. If the person is required to identify the documents, 
however, he will have to testify in this regard. This testimony will have to be given 
during the trial to afford the state opportunity to cross-examine the witness and 
to ensure that findings made by the court form part of the trial record. Ferreira 
(Strafproses in die Laerhowe (1979) 160) does not specifically discuss this aspect 
but nevertheless refers to attendance of the trial when referring to the subpoena 
duces tecum. Meintjies-Van der Walt on the other hand argues that documents 
obtained through subpoena duces tecum are produced only during the trial and not 
before trial (see “Pre-trial disclosure of expert evidence: lessons from abroad” 2000 
SACJ 145 149). This will however have the result that documents required for trial 
preparation will become available only during the course of the trial.
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Reference has been made earlier to documents or information that an accused 
regards as necessary to prepare for his defence, but that does not form part of the police 
docket and that is not in possession of the state. It is submitted that the procedure of a 
subpoena duces tecum would be the appropriate procedure for an accused to follow in 
obtaining such information. In the Kerkhoff case the court made an obiter reference 
to this procedure. It is submitted that the applicant in that matter should have caused 
a subpoena duces tecum to be issued in respect of the sixth and seventh respondents, 
requesting them to produce the required documents in court. If the respondents still 
declined to make the documents available, the court would have had to consider the 
reasons for refusal to disclose and made the appropriate order.
6  Conclusion
The approach adopted by the constitutional court in the Shabalala case (par 46) 
with reliance on Stinchcombe v The Queen (18 CRR (2d) 210) that “… the search 
for truth is advanced rather than retarded by disclosure of all relevant material” 
placed the prosecution’s duty to disclose on a sound footing and certainly enhanced 
the legal culture of accountability and transparency. It is clear that in terms of its 
policy directives the prosecution follows an accommodating approach in respect of 
docket disclosure. Disclosure is therefore made as a rule in all cases in respect of 
part A, including those matters listed in the Shabalala case as possible exclusions. 
This is most probably a practical arrangement aimed at ensuring a uniform national 
approach and sensible utilization of court resources. One should however also be alive 
to the negative possibility that “any new procedure can offer opportunities capable 
of exploitation to obstruct or delay” or that an accused, instead of confronting the 
charge, attacks the prosecution (the King case (par 8)). This negative side of an 
otherwise positive development is clearly illustrated in the Kerkhoff and King cases. 
As illustrated in these cases, preliminary litigation of this nature serves little or no 
purpose other than to delay the efficient and speedy conclusion of criminal trials. The 
frequent abuse of this type of litigation is a matter for concern: a mere six months 
after the King judgment, the supreme court of appeal had to again express itself in 
strong terms against preliminary litigation (see Van der Merwe v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions 2011 1 SACR 94 (SCA)). What is of importance, though, is that 
our courts have been alive to the possible negative consequences that underpinned the 
initial objections to docket disclosure as well as more recent legal stratagems to abuse 
the right of access to information and have expressed themselves clearly in this regard. 
That South Africa is not in a unique position is illustrated by the following remark in 
the McNeil case: “it is important for the effective administration of justice that criminal 
trials remain focused on the issues to be tried and that scarce judicial resources not be 
squandered in ‘fishing expeditions’ for irrelevant evidence” (par 28).
The constitutional duty to disclose supplemented by the procedures in sections 
87 and 179 of the act provide sufficient mechanisms to an accused person to obtain 
the necessary information to protect his fair trial rights. When confronted with 
disclosure applications of the nature displayed in the Kerkhoff and King cases, 
however, courts will do well to remind themselves of the comment by Harms DP in 
the King case that “[f]airness is not a one-way street conferring an unlimited right 
on an accused to demand the most favourable possible treatment, but also requires 
fairness to the public as represented by the state” (par 5).
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ENKELE OPMERKINGS NA AANLEIDING VAN AANKOPE PER 
INTERNETVEILING
1 Winskopiejagters kom in iedere gemeenskap met ’n gesonde kapitalistiese trek 
voor. Menige persoon droom daarvan om die objek van sy of haar drome teen ’n 
breukdeel van die normale prys te bekom. Nie om dowe neute nie is daar gereeld 
berigte van stormlope en vertrappings by buitengewone uitverkopings soos die van 
Woolworths en word die tradisionele winter- en someruitverkopings in Europa druk 
besoek.
’n Variasie op die deurwinterde uitverkopingsnuffelaar is die passievolle 
veilingganger. Ook in ons gemeenskap was van oudsher bekend dat dié of dáárdie 
persoon op iedere vendusie sy opwagting maak en saambie indien hy meen dat die 
saak onder die hamer ’n winskopie is. Die potensiële objekte strek van grond en 
vee in die landelike gemeenskap tot huishoudelike artikels en kuns by die meer 
verstedelikte tipes. (Hier word nie nou ingegaan op die contradictio in terminis 
vervat in die noem van ’n “winskoop” in een asem met die aanskaffing per veiling 
van ’n kunswerk nie. Juis kuns het geen objektiewe waarde nie, en die waarde is altyd 
dit wat die hoogste bieder daar en dan bereid is om op te dok – “pretia rerum non 
ex affectu nec utilitate singulorum, sed communiter funguntur” D 35 2 63pr – die 
waarde van sake word nie volgens persoonlike gevoelens of voordeel bereken nie, 
maar normaalweg bereken teen die prys wat hulle op ’n veiling sou haal.) Uiteraard 
word die doel verpas om ’n winskopie op te snap indien in die geroesemoes van die 
adrenalien gedrewe opjaag van die prys deur ’n bedrewe afslaer se afspeel van een 
bod teen die ander, die aanvanklik heimlike bogrens as aanvaarbare prys vir die 
artikel oorskry word. Dan bly sit die finale bieër dikwels met ’n toegeslane bod teen 
’n prys wat met die definisie van ’n winskoop niks gemeen het nie.
Met die toenemende populariteit en benuttingsmoontlikhede van die internet 
was dit te wagte dat ook dié platform deur winskopiejagters aangegryp sou word. 
(Schlömer en Dittrich het verwys na ’n sterk stygende tendens van die getal benutters 
wat reeds vyf jaar gelede tot byna 250 miljoen gestyg het en sedertdien niks minder 
geword het nie “eBay & Recht – Bilanz der Rechtsprechung” 2007 BB 2129-2136.) 
Per slot van rekening kan nou vanuit die beskermde huislike atmosfeer per muisklik 
wêreldwyd aan veilings deelgeneem word, waar vanouds die fisiese beweeglikheid 
van die potensiële bieër na die volgende veiling dikwels ’n praktiese belemmering 
was om sy biesug te bevredig. Meerdere internetplatforms word vir die doel bedryf 
en in talle huishoudings pryk tans pronkstukke van versamelaarsporselein tot silwer 
wat op ’n veiling op die internet as ’n sogenaamde winskoop bekom is.
Die meeste van die platforms het “huisreëls” wat die meedoen aan die veiling 
beheers. Uiteraard is so ’n veiling per internet meer riskant as om fisies op ’n veiling 
van Sotheby’s te gaan sit en bie vir byvoorbeeld die voorhande skildery. Niks kom 
by die klassieke “Handkauf” wat in die Wes-Romeinse reg hoogty gevier het en 
waar danksy traditio vera as voorkeur leweringsvorm, die verkoper aan die koper 
na afsluiting van die koopkontrak en nadat die koper hom vergewis het van die 
eienskappe van die koopsaak, ook daar en dan die gekoopte saak gelewer het de 
manu in manum ten einde die eiendomsoordrag te bewerkstellig nie. In die virtuele 
omgewing is daar daarenteen altyd die gevaar dat die aangebode artikel slegs 
kamma-kamma beskikbaar was of nie werklik die eienskappe het wat dit tot dié 
winskoop van die dag sou verhef nie.
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